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I. INTRODUCTION
"Blood may be thicker than water, but oil is thicker than both."'
Lawyers, landmen, landowners, and producers face a long list of
perennial problems when interpreting or drafting documents that affect
mineral estates. I have written extensively about these problems, including
the "fixed or floating" non-participating royalty issue addressed in a recent
Texas Supreme Court case, Hysaw v. Dawkins.2 In that case, three siblings,
who were beneficiaries of their mother's will, disputed the appellate court's
holding that the double fraction 1/3 of 1/8 created a "fixed" 1/24th
non-participating royalty interest (NPRi), rather than a "floating" 1/3
NPRi.3 The dispute arose when one sibling leased her land and negotiated a
1/5th landowner's lease royalty, rather than the once-common 1/8th.4 The
case presented the Texas Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify
mixed results from appellate court cases. This Article reviews cases prior to
Hysaw and discusses the lessons that opinion provides regarding the "fixed
or floating" NPRi issue. The Article concludes that Hysaw has clarified the
law by confirming a holistic approach that eschews bright-line rules, such
as merely multiplying fractions in deeds with double or restated fractions.
Instead, the opinion endorses an analysis approach that turns to the "estate
misconception" and the legacy of the once-common 1/8th landowner's
royalty when interpreting such deeds. Hysaw also provides direction for
drafting and should create predictability for owners and producers that will
improve title stability in the shale era.
1. Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 6 n.4 (Tex. 2016) (citing Dallas Television Show,
JR. Ewing, perf. by Larry Hagman).
2. 483 S.W.3d I (Tex. 2016). The author worked on this case in the Texas Supreme Court
jointly with Mary Keeney, Boyce Cabaniss, and John McFarland, the lawyers who represented the
Hysaw parties in the trial court and court of appeals.
3. Id. at 4, 6-7.
4. Id. at 6.
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II. BACKGROUND: WHY DRAFTERS USE DOUBLE, RESTATED, OR
CONFLICTING FRACTIONS
Property owners face two key decisions when creating, by grant or
reservation, interests in their subsurface estates: first, whether to create a
mineral interest or a royalty interest; and second, what the fractional size of
that interest should be.' This section examines courts' interpretations of
deeds affecting the second decision and the lessons those decisions teach
regarding drafting in the shale era.
A. Why Conflicting Fractions Were Used and Why They Are Not
Necessary
Assume Owner has decided to convey to Grantee an undivided 1/2
fractional mineral interest, rather than a royalty interest. Assume also that
Owner has previously leased his land to Oil Company with a familiar lease
form, which is commonly viewed as creating a fee simple determinable
estate in the lessee. That lease is an older version requiring the lessee to pay
the owner-lessor the traditional, but no longer common, 1/8 landowner's
royalty.' This form lease conveys a fee simple determinable estate in all, or
8/8, of the mineral estate to Oil Company, leaving Owner with a
non-possessory future interest, called a possibility of reverter, in all, or 8/8,
of the mineral estate.' Note that only in the oil patch will one find "the
whole" defined as 8/8. As described below, this phenomenon and others
stem from the legacy of the 1/8 royalty in older form leases.
Today it is clear that Owner's pre-existing lease has not converted
Owner's interest in the mineral estate from an interest in all (8/8) to only
1/8.8 The lease's royalty clause entitles Owner to a share of the proceeds
5. Part II of this Article is an excerpt from Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles:
Resolving Perennial Problems in the Shale Era, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 103-22 (2013)
[hereinafter Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles]. This Article includes a discussion of the first
question I mention: whether the parties intend to create a mineral or a royalty interest.
6. See Laura H. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds: The Legacy of the One-
Eighth Royalty and Other Stories, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 28 (2001) [hereinafter Burney,
Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds] (acknowledging leases traditionally convey a 1/8
royalty).
7. See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex.
1998); PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS 818 (11th ed. 2000) [hereinafter MARTIN & KRAMER, OIL AND GAS TERMS]
(describing a possibility of reverter as the "interest left in a grantor or lessor after a grant of land
or minerals subject to a special limitation"); I ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER,
TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.9(E), at 3-78 (2d ed. 2014) (noting possibility of reverter is
vested interest lessor retains after granting a lease).
8. Laura H. Burney, The Interaction of the Division Order and the Lease Royalty Clause,
28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 429 (1997) [hereinafter Burney, Interaction of the Division Order] ("[I]t
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from the sale of the production, but does not reduce the size of his
possibility of reverter.9 Owner owns a non-possessory interest in all (8/8) of
the minerals, but he can convey a fractional interest subject to the
pre-existing lease. To convey the desired undivided 1/2 mineral interest, the
Owner should use "mineral" language and insert the fraction 1/2 in the
form's designated space for the fractional interest Owner intends to
convey."o
1. Why Multiclause Deed Forms Were Used and Why They Are Not
Necessary
Another fact is clear today: as a matter of law, Grantee's 1/2 undivided
ownership in Owner's mineral estate entitles her to a proportionate share of
the rents and royalties payable under the terms of the pre-existing lease
between Owner and Oil Company." Therefore, after the conveyance, Oil
Company owes 1/2 of the 1/8 landowner's lease royalty to Owner and the
other 1/2 to Grantee.12 That fact, however, eluded early courts.
For example, in Caruthers v. Leonard,13 the court held that a
conveyance subject to an existing lease did not entitle the grantee to a
proportionate share of the rents and royalties payable under that existing
lease.14 In response to that decision, which was later overruled," a notorious
deed form with multiple clauses and spaces for fractions developed to
insure that Grantee received rents and royalties in proportion to the
should be considered well-settled in Texas that the oil and gas lease vests 8/8ths of the oil and gas
in the lessee, not 7/8ths, with the lessor retaining a possibility of reverter in 8/8ths.").
9. Id. (noting lessor retains a possibility of reverter in all 8/8).
10. For examples of deed forms for accomplishing these goals, see 6 WILLIAM B.
BURFORD, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 1:3, at 33-35 (4th ed. 2008) and 4
ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION
§ 23.70, at 529 (3d ed. 2005).
11. See, e.g., Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 464 (finding grantor's possibility of reverter of
1/12 of the mineral interests included a right to royalties under the lease terms); see also Burney,
Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 14 (noting "the deed effectively
conveyed all attributes" of the mineral lease, including the right to share royalties).
12. The proportionate reduction clause in typical lease forms allows the lessee to reduce
these payments proportionately to Owner and Grantee if they have leased 100%. See MARTIN &
KRAMER, OIL AND GAS Terms, supra note 7, at 871-72 (defining "proportionate reduction clause"
and noting that the purpose of such a clause is to reduce the payments to a lessor to be in
proportion to the lessor's interest).
13. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. 1923), abrogated by Hager v. Stakes, 294 S.W. 835 (Tex. 1927).
14. Id. at 782-83; see Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine
in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REv. 73, 87-89 (1993) [hereinafter Burney,
Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine] (discussing the legacy of the Caruthers decision).
15. See generally Hager, 294 S.W. 835 (overruling Caruthers); Harris v. Currie, 176
S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. 1943) (noting Hager's overruling of Caruthers).
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fractional mineral interest conveyed.'6 Specifically, in addition to the
granting clause, this deed form recited that the conveyance is made "subject
to" the existing lease and "covers and includes" the specified fractional
interest of rents and royalties in the existing lease." Another clause
provided that the grantee would receive the stated fractional interest in rents
and royalties payable under future leases." Notably, these additional
"subject to" and "future lease" clauses lacked granting clause language.1 9
The reason for this omission is simple: these clauses were inserted not to
make additional grants, but to clarify that the grantee receives a
proportionate amount of rents and royalties under any lease, whether
existing or future.20
Courts eventually corrected the errors of Caruthers.21 But the form,
which should be avoided, exists in formbooks today.22 If filled out properly,
with the same fraction in every clause, the form presents no problems for
title examiners or courts. Unfortunately, misconceptions among laypersons
and legal minds have complicated drafting and interpreting these deeds. The
primary offender is the "estate misconception."23
2. Role of the "Estate Misconception" and "The Legacy of the 1/8th
Landowner's Royalty"
The estate misconception-a legacy of the "usual 1/8th landowner's
royalty"-describes the confusion regarding estate ownership after leasing
property.24 In the example above, Owner, under the influence of the estate
misconception, assumed the lease converted his ownership to 1/8 in the
mineral estate. Therefore, if Owner intended to convey an undivided 1/2
16. See generally Burney, Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at
86-90 (outlining the development of the multiclause deed form).
17. Id. at 86.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id. ("The . . . multiclause deed was created in response to an early Texas cause,
Caruthers v. Leonard, which held that when a grantee received an interest in a mineral estate that
was already under lease, only a reversionary interest passed ..... (footnote omitted)).
21. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. 1943) (noting the court in Hager overruled
Caruthers).
22. See, e.g., BURFORD, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 3-7 (outlining the various clauses included
in a mineral deed form and cautioning against "coupling with a grant of the minerals the words
'royalty,' 'royalty interest,' or minerals 'produced and saved' from the land" to avoid conveying a
royalty interest).
23. See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex.
1998) (defining "estate misconception" and describing its effect on drafting); Burney, Regrettable
Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 87-89 (reviewing the estate misconception).
24. See Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining
lessors sometimes believe they only own 1/8 interest in the minerals after the lease when in
actuality they have a possibility of reverter in all, 8/8).
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interest, he multiplied that fraction by 1/8 and inserted the fraction 1/16 in
the deed's granting clause. Because of the wording of the other
post-Caruthers clauses-the "subject to" and "future lease" clauses-
Owner inserted the fraction 1/2 in those spaces, creating a deed with
conflicting fractions.25
B. Interpreting Multiclause Deeds with Conflicting Fractions: The Birth
and Demise of the "Two-Grant" Doctrine
These multiple fractions created uncertainty for title examiners. Which
fraction represented the size of the interest Owner intended to convey? Or,
did the deed make multiple grants? Early cases provided an answer: deeds
with multiple and conflicting fractions conveyed more than one interest.26
Writers labeled this interpretative approach the "two-grant" doctrine.27 In
this section, I review the development and demise of the two-grant
approach to interpreting deeds with conflicting fractions. The next section
updates a related issue: deed forms with double or restated fractions.
1. Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Production Co.
The two-grant doctrine arose in Texas, where the multiclause deed
form originated. Texas courts adopted this interpretative approach for
multiclause deed forms with conflicting fractions beginning in the 1940s.28
The last supreme court case to address the two-grant doctrine is a 1998
opinion, Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Production Co.29
In Concord Oil, courts were confronted with this deed: a 1937
conveyance of a mineral interest with the fraction 1/96 in the granting
25. See Burney, Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 86-87
(emphasizing the effect of the Caruthers decision on deed forms and noting that grantors wishing
to convey a one-half mineral interest "can do so by simply conveying a 1/2 mineral interest,
regardless of an existing lease").
26. Some cases viewed these deeds as granting one fraction at delivery of the deed that
expanded upon expiration of the existing lease. See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d
466, 469 (Tex. 1991) (noting that upon termination of the lease, the grantee's interest "expanded
into a full one-half [mineral interest] by operation of law"); see also Burney, Regrettable Rebirth
of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 92-94 (discussing the "expansion facet" and related
decisions, including Jupiter Oil).
27. See Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 454 (discussing the trial court's reliance on the
two-grant doctrine in its decision and defining the doctrine); 2 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M.
KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 327.2, at 90-91 (2012) [hereinafter
MARTIN & KRAMER, OIL AND GAS LAW]; Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the "Repugnant to
the Grant" Doctrine, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 635, 651-52 (1990).
28. Burney, Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 90.
29. 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).
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clause and the fraction 1/12 in a subsequent clause.30 At the time, the
grantor owned a 1/12 mineral interest in the property, which was burdened
by a preexisting lease providing for a 1/8 landowner's royalty.31 Notably,
the deed through which the grantor had received his 1/12 mineral interest a
year earlier, was the same as the 1937 deed form, but the fraction 1/12
appeared in both clauses.3 2
By the 1960s, Pennzoil owned the grantor's interest, if any, under the
1937 deed, and Concord Oil owned the grantee's interest.3 3 Just as today's
shale plays are spawning lawsuits over mineral deeds delivered decades
ago, renewed production on property covered by the 1937 deed prompted
Pennzoil to sue Concord Oil in 1993.34
Pennzoil relied on precedent establishing the two-grant approach for
interpreting multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions.35 Under that
approach, Pennzoil argued that the 1937 deed had conveyed a 1/96 mineral
interest and a 1/12 interest in rents and royalties under an existing lease,
which had terminated.36 Therefore, Pennzoil claimed that Concord Oil, as
successor to the grantee, owned only a 1/96 interest in the mineral estate,
meaning Pennzoil owned the grantor's remaining interest.37 Concord Oil,
on the other hand, argued that the 1937 deed conveyed the grantor's entire
1/12 interest and Pennzoil received nothing through its chain of title.38
The trial court and court of appeals agreed with Pennzoil.39 Eventually,
however, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in favor of Concord Oil, holding
that the conflicting fractions could be harmonized from the four-corners of
the document.4 0 In light of the particular language of the 1937 deed, the
court held it conveyed a single 1/ 12 mineral interest.41
However, because the opinion was a plurality, with concurring and
dissenting opinions, the fate of the two-grant doctrine remained unclear.42
30. Id. at 453.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (noting Concord Oil Company's claim was brought through the grantee of the 1937
deed and that the 1937 grantor conveyed another mineral deed in 1961 which was subsequently
conveyed to Pennzoil Exploration and Production Company).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 454.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 453-54.
39. Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 878 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1994) (rejecting Concord's reading of the deed to convey two separate
estates), rev'd, 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).
40. Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 457-61, 463.
41. Id. at 459.
42. The opinion breaks down to a 4-1-4 decision. Id. at 451. The plurality found that the
deed conveyed a single 1/12 mineral interest and harmonized the conflicting fractions within the
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Concord Oil had urged the court to reject the two-grant doctrine and
embrace the estate misconception as the explanation for conflicting
fractions in multiclause deed forms.43 As explained above, that
misconception, which emanates from the typical 1/8 landowner's royalty,
explains why the conflicting fractions follow a pattern: they are multiples of
1/8, even though the fraction 1/8 does not appear in the deed. Typically,
drafters multiplied the intended fraction by 1/8 and inserted that number in
the granting clause. Indeed, early case law sanctioned that approach." The
1937 Concord Oil deed followed the pattern: 1/96 in the granting clause
= 1/8 times 1/12 (the fraction in the subsequent clause).45 As noted in
Concord Oil, in light of the language appearing in the subsequent clauses,
that 1/12 fraction, rather than the smaller 1/96 fraction in the granting
clause, reflects the drafter's intent about the size of the interest the grantor
intended to convey.4 6
a. The Court Declined to Follow the Kansas Approach Regarding the
Estate Misconception
To convince the Texas court to incorporate the estate misconception
into the interpretative process, Concord Oil pointed to Kansas decisions.
Specifically, in Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
4 7 the
Kansas Supreme Court construed a reservation in a deed that described the
size of the interest as "an undivided 1/4 of the landowners [sic] 1/8 royalty,
or, 1/32 of the interest in and to all oil, gas or other minerals . .. ."4 The
court held the grantor had reserved a 1/4 mineral interest.49 In reaching this
conclusion, the court incorporated into its interpretative process the
deed. Id. at 459. The concurring opinion by Justice Enoch agreed that only a single estate was
created but wrote separately to emphasize the overconveyance that would occur if the dissent's
interpretations were used. Id. at 463-64 (Enoch, J., concurring). The dissent argued for the
"two-grant" doctrine to determine that two estates were created, "a 1/96 perpetual interest in the
minerals, and a 1/12 interest in rentals and royalties . . . ." Id. at 465 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 460 (plurality opinion).
44. Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ.
ref'd); see Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 464-65 (Enoch, J., concurring) (blessing the use of
different fractions to convey a single interest); see also Burney, Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-
Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 102 (noting the reliance on Tipps in interpreting multiclause
deeds).
45. See Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 453 (plurality opinion).
46. See id. at 457-59.
47. 368 P.2d 19 (Kan. 1962).
48. Id. at 21. The Shepard deed was not a multiclause deed form, but it contained multiple
fractions. The Shepard deed form involved "double and restated" fractions discussed in the next
section. See infra Part II.C.
49. Id. at 27.
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pervasive confusion among "not only persons in the petroleum industry"
but with courts:
As the most common leasing arrangement provides for a one-eighth
royalty reserved to the lessor, the confusion of fractional interests
stems primarily from the mistaken premise that all the lessor-land-
owner owns is a one-eighth royalty. In conveying minerals subject to
an existing lease .. . mistake is often made in the fraction of the
minerals conveyed by multiplying the intended fraction by
one-eighth.50
In Concord Oil, however, the Texas Supreme Court declined to fully
follow the Shepard approach. Instead, the court noted the estate
misconception, but viewed it as "instructive, but not dispositive."1 In fact,
the court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for this interpretative issue,
focusing instead on the lack of any two-grant language in the 1937 deed.52
b. Guidelines from Concord Oil's "Four-Corners" Approach
Yet, as I wrote in an earlier article, the Concord Oil opinion provided
"useful guidance to title examiners" for interpreting multiclause deeds:
First, according to the opinion, a deed with multiple fractions should
not be interpreted as making two grants unless express language to
that effect appears in the deed. Such language would include the
phrases "separate from" or "in addition to," phrases which were
absent from the Concord deed. Notably, [the additional clauses in
multiclause deed forms] do not contain such granting language.
Therefore, multiclause deed forms should rarely, if ever, be
interpreted as making separate grants.53
Because of the multiple opinions in Concord Oil, title examiners
remained cautious about interpreting multiclause deed forms with
conflicting fractions. The concurring opinion created particular concern by
focusing on the "future lease" clause.54 In his opinion, Justice Enoch
50. Id. at 26 (citing Magnusson v. Colo. Oil & Gas Corp., 331 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Kan.
1958)). Shepard did not involve a multiclause deed form; rather, the language fits the "restated" or
"double fraction" problem. See Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1158-59 (Kan. 1984)
(construing deed with fractions 1/16 and 1/2 as conveying an undivided 1/2 mineral interest); see
also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 22 (noting the
pervasiveness of the 1/8 royalty in other jurisdictions).
51. Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 460.
52. See id. at 460-61.
53. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 16 (citations
omitted).
54. Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 464 (Enoch, J., concurring) ("Further, we were wrong to
conclude that the 'subject to' clause of the Crosby deed includes future leases."). For a complete
analysis of the concurring opinion, see Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra
note 6, at 17-18. Justice Enoch was also concerned with the "overconveyance" issue. Id.
2016] 123
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criticized the plurality opinion for having emphasized a "future lease"
clause in the deed as the basis for concluding the 1937 deed conveyed a
1/12 interest.55 However, the plurality opinion adopted a four-corners
approach and placed no significance on the presence or absence of any
clause, particularly a "future lease" clause.56 On the contrary, that opinion
states that the "decision in this case does not depend on the presence or
absence of a 'future lease' clause, which the court of appeals found
dispositive.""
2. Post-Concord Oil Decisions: The Demise of the "Two-Grant"
Doctrine
Despite these words from the Texas Supreme Court about the relative
insignificance of a "future lease" clause, a post-Concord Oil appellate
opinion considered it determinative in Neel v. Killam Oil Co., Ltd.," which
involved a multiclause deed form that departed from the typical pattern.
Specifically, in the 1945 Neel deed, the larger fraction 1/2 appeared in the
granting clause and "subject to" clause, and the smaller fraction 1/16
appeared in the "future lease" clause.59 The parties agreed the interest was a
royalty interest, rather than a mineral interest.60 Regarding the size of the
interest, grantee's successor argued the deed conveyed a 1/2 royalty, which
would entitle the grantee to 1/2 of the royalty reserved in any existing or
future leases.61 To counter assertions that the granting clause and "future
lease" clause made separate grants, the grantee pointed to this sentence in
the deed's granting clause: "This grant shall run forever."62 The controversy
arose after the existing lease, with the typical 1/8 landowner's royalty,
terminated and new leases were executed providing for a 1/4 royalty.63 The
court of appeals ruled against the grantee, holding the grantee was entitled
to a fixed 1/16 interest in production under the new leases as provided in
(explaining a two-grant interpretation of the deed would result in the grantor conveying more than
he owned, which he cannot do).
55. See Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 463-64.
56. See id. at 457-59 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 458-59.
58. 88 S.W.3d 334, 340-41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied), disapproved ofby
Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
59. Id. at 339.
60. See id. The parties disagreed about whether this royalty interest was a fixed 1/16 or a
1/2 royalty that entitled the owner to 1/2 of the royalty reserved in any lease. See id. This "fixed"
versus "of' royalty issue is common. See infra Part II.C (discussing double and restated fractions).
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the "future lease" clause.64 In other words, in Neel the court reverted to the
two-grant doctrine.
In reaching this conclusion, the Neel court cited Concord Oil and Luckel,
explaining that those cases required it to seek the parties' intent from the four
corners of the document.65 However, the Neel opinion omits any review of
the two-grant saga, or of the specifics from Concord Oil, such as the court's
admonition that to create separate grants a deed should contain clear evidence
of such intent.66 Had the Neel court followed Concord Oil's guidance, the
deed would have been interpreted as conveying the 1/2 "of' royalty forever
as set forth in the granting clause. The estate misconception explains the
fraction in the "future lease" clause: 1/16 reflects the amount of production
owed to the owner of a royalty entitled to 1/2 of the 1/8 royalty reserved in
the typical lease royalty clause.67
Although the Texas Supreme Court declined to review Neel, a recent
opinion from the same court of appeals "disapprove[d] of [its] analysis in
Neel."68 Hausser v. Cuellar69 involved a multiclause deed form that, like the
deed in Neel, contained conflicting fractions that departed from the Concord
Oil pattern.70 In Hausser, the clauses provided as follows: granting clause:
1/2; "subject to" clause: 1/2; "future lease" clause: 1/16." After determining
that the deed conveyed a royalty interest, the court considered whether it was
a fixed 1/16 or a 1/2 royalty interest that entitled the owner to 1/2 of the 1/4
landowner's royalty in new leases on the property.72 In adopting the 1/2
royalty option, the court cited its 2006 opinion in Garza v. Prolithic Energy
Co.,` and explained its analysis as follows: "As in Garza, our decision is
consistent with Concord Oil Co. because the [Hausser] deed does not contain
64. Id. at 341. Neel was heard by the Fourth District Court of Appeals in San Antonio, the
same court that decided Concord Oil prior to its review by the Supreme Court.
65. Id. at 339-40 (citations omitted).
66. See id. (citing to Concord Oil but failing to mention the court's rejection of the two-
grant doctrine); see also Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451,
454, 457 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting the two-grant doctrine in favor of a clear intent approach).
67. See supra Part II.A.2.
68. Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
In disapproving, the court pointed to the Neel opinion's reliance on a previous deed, which could
suggest the court approved of Neel's focus on the "future lease" clause. Id. Fortunately, the
Hausser court embraced Concord Oil's guidance and cited one of its previous opinions, Garza,
which clearly rejected the two-grant doctrine and incorporated the estate misconception into its
analysis. See id. at 470-71 (citing Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (noting the conflicting fractions arise due to the typical
1/8th royalty and confusion about what grantors actually own)).
69. 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied).
70. See id. at 468-69.
71. Id. at 465, 468.
72. See id. at 470-71.
73. 195 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
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any language suggesting two differing estates were being conveyed....
Rather, the [Hausser] deed, like the deeds in Garza, involves a single
conveyance with fixed rights."74
A dissenting opinion in Hausser argued that the "future lease" clause
should have controlled.75 However, in light of the majority's disapproval of
Neel, its adherence to Concord Oil's guidelines, and other recent appellate
court decisions that acknowledge the role of the estate misconception, the
two-grant doctrine should disappear in Texas. Fortunately, other jurisdictions
have wisely declined to adopt Texas's approach. Therefore, title examiners
may report, without exaggerating, the death of the two-grant doctrine for
interpreting multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions in the shale era.
Unfortunately, as described in the next section, court opinions, at least prior to
Hysaw, had not correctly incorporated the estate misconception or the "legacy
of the 1/8th royalty" into the interpretative process for related issues: deeds
with double or restated fractions.
C. "Double" or "Restated" Fractions-The Continued Legacy of the
"Usual 1/8th Landowner's Royalty" in the Shale Era: The "Analyze"
v. "Multiply" Debate
Writing before the shale era, I addressed these two interpretative
issues: how should courts interpret deeds when the fractional interest
conveyed or reserved is expressed (1) as a double fraction, such as "1/2 of
1/8," or (2) as a restated fraction, such as "an undivided 1/2 non-
74. Hausser, 345 S.W.3d at 470 (citing Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 146; Concord Oil Co. v.
Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. 1998)).
75. See Hausser, 345 SW.3d at 472-73 (Marion, J., dissenting). Note the same judge wrote
the majority opinion in Neel v. Killam Oil Co., Ltd., 88 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, pet. denied), disapproved of by Hausser, 345 S.W.3d at 470.
76. See Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 343-44 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2007, pet. denied) (holding although there were differing fractions in the deed, only a single
interest was actually conveyed); Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 145 (noting the "problematic conflict
between the granting of a mineral interest and a future lease provision appearing to convey a
smaller royalty interest"); see also Coates Energy Tr. v. Frost Nat'l Bank, No. 04-11-00838-CV,
2012 WL 5984693, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 28, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(relying on Hausser in determining the fraction conveyed); Hernandez v. El Paso Prod. Co., No.
13-09-184-CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi Apr. 14, 2011, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (taking notice of the estate misconception).
77. See Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles, supra note 5, at 131 (describing Kansas's
method of dealing with mineral deeds); see also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds,
supra note 6, at 23 ("[T]he Arkansas Supreme Court considered the issue that led the Texas courts
down the path to the creative two-grants rule . . . ." (quoting Owen L. Anderson, Recent
Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, in 45TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS
LAW AND TAXATION 1-1, § 1.03[4], at 1-14 (Carol J. Holgren ed., 1994))). But see Jolly v.
Wilson, 478 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Okla. 1970) (holding reservation created 1/16th mineral interest,
entitling owner to 1/128th of production where standard lease royalty was 1/8th).
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participating royalty (being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16)."" In
one article, I note courts' failure to address the "legacy of the usual 1/8th
landowner's royalty," which contributes to the estate misconception, and its
effect on drafting and interpreting double and restated fractions.79 Because
parties focused on that royalty, they expressed fractions with a double
fraction, where one was invariably 1/8, or by restating with a fraction equal
to a multiple of 1/8, as in the restated example above.80 Rather than analyze
that legacy in light of other language in the deed, courts tended to ignore it
or merely multiply the fractions.
For example, in a 1984 Texas Supreme Court case, Alford v. Krum,8 1
the multiclause deed contained a double fraction, 1/2 of 1/8, in the granting
clause.8 2 The court viewed that clause as conveying a 1/16 interest, without
noting or analyzing this mode of expressing that single fraction." This
phenomenon, like the use of the fraction 8/8 to express the term "all,"
appears only in the oil patch. And again, the legacy of the usual 1/8 royalty
explains the practice, since one of the two fractions is invariably the
traditional 1/8 landowner's royalty. Yet, in Alford and other cases, court
opinions multiply the fractions without analyzing the reason for the
formula.8 4
Before Alford, proponents of the analysis approach had argued that
courts should incorporate the legacy of the 1/8 royalty into the interpretative
process for these fractional issues." Under such an approach, the double or
restated fractions "should not be multiplied, but analyzed to determine the
parties' intent."86 However, not all commentators agree with this approach.
Specifically, the Williams & Meyers Treatise argues that double fractions
should be multiplied under a plain meaning approach to document
78. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 23-29; Burney,
Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 89-97. The restated language in
the example appeared in Brown v. Havard, which held that the phrase "[bjeing equal to, not less
than an undivided 1/16th" made the deed ambiguous and subsequently remanded the case to the
trial court. Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1980).
79. See generally Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6.
80. See id. at 15.
81. 671 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.
1991).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 874. Alford adopted the "granting clause" prevails rule for the multiclause
deed problem, but was subsequently overruled by Luckel. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461.
84. See, e.g., Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 873.
85. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 24 (citing Ernest E.
Smith, Conveyancing Problems, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED OIL, GAS, & MINERAL
LAW COURSE G, G-2 (1981)).
86. Id. at 25. Not all commentators agree with this approach. See MARTIN & KRAMER, OIL
AND GAS LAW, supra note 27, § 327.3, at 3-96.
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interpretation." As described below, recent court opinions also reflect
contradictory opinions in resolving these disputes.
1. Shale Era Cases: Conflicting Approaches from Appellate Opinions
Demonstrating that shale-production surges produce title-litigation
surges, Texas courts addressed several disputes involving double and
restated fractions. Most of these cases involve the grant or reservation of
royalty interests in which the dispute centers on one question: whether the
deed created a "fixed" or an "of' royalty interest, also known as a floating
interest. A "fixed" royalty entitles the owner to a set share of the proceeds
from the sale of production, regardless of the fractional size of the
landowner's royalty in any lease." An "of' royalty interest varies or floats
with the size of the landowner's royalty in leases." As demonstrated in the
cases discussed below, these disputes arise when the royalty in a new lease
departs from the traditional 1/8 landowner's royalty.
87. See, e.g., MARTIN & KRAMER, OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 27, § 327.3, at 3-96;
Phillip E. Norvell, Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty:
Calculating the Royalty Share and Coexisting with the Duty Owed to the Non-Participating
Royalty Owner by the Executive Interest, 48 ARK. L. REV. 933, 951 (1995). The author approves
of the "multiply" approach used by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Palmer v. Lide, in which the
court held:
It will be seen that the deed refers not once but four times either to 1/8th of 1/8th
of the royalty or to 1/8th of 1/8th of the royalty to be retained or reserved in any
oil, gas, or mineral lease, leases, or contracts. It is not possible to interpret the
unmistakably clear language of the deed to mean 1/8th of 1/8th of the total
production, as the appellant would have us do.
Palmer v. Lide, 567 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Ark. 1978). The author concludes that
[o]ne cannot quarrel with the construction of the "double fraction" formula by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide .... However, one is haunted by the fear that the
"horrors of the double fraction" may be the result of an error based simply on the
parties' selection of the wrong royalty deed form.
Norvell, supra at 951.
88. SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 7, § 3.7, at 3-46 to -47.
89. See Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2008, pet. denied) (comparing a fraction "of' royalty versus a "fractional" royalty and stating that
a fraction "of' royalty "'floats' in accordance with the size of the landowner's royalty contained in
the lease"); see also MARTIN & KRAMER, OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 27, § 327.3, at 94. There
is an additional difference: the effect of the executive's duty to lease. With an "of' royalty, the
executive could potentially breach the duty of "utmost good faith" by negotiating a landowner's
royalty that was too low. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 348, 364-65 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457
S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015). If the royalty interest is fixed, however, the negotiated royalty cannot
affect the "fixed" owner's share of production. See id. (discussing cases in which the executive
breached the duty of utmost good faith by entering into a lease depriving the royalty owner of
benefits they would have received in a lease to a disinterested party).
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Hudspeth v. Berry,90 a 2010 opinion, involved a dispute over a 1943
deed reserving an "undivided 1/40th royalty interest (being 1/5th of 1/8th)"
with grantee reserving leasing rights, and the grantor receiving 1/5 of the
usual 1/8 royalty.9' The Berrys owned the reserved interest and claimed
their predecessors were each entitled to 1/5 of the 1/5 landowner's royalty
reserved in a new lease, or 1/25 of the proceeds from production.92 As a
result, the Berrys claimed they were entitled to a total of 2/25 of the
production proceeds.93 The trial court agreed with the Berrys'
interpretation.94 The court of appeals, however, held the deed reserved two
fixed 1/40 royalty interests, a ruling the Berrys did not appeal to the Texas
Supreme Court.95
However, an opinion decided two years before Berry addressed a deed
with similar language, including an express reference to a royalty the size
"of' the usual 1/8 lease royalty. The deed in that case, Range Resources
Corp. v. Bradshaw,96 reserved:
[A]n undivided one-half (1/2) Royalty (Being equal to not less than
an undivided one-sixteent[h] (1/16)[)] of all the oil, gas and/or other
minerals ... to be paid or delivered to said Grantors ... free of cost
Forever .... In the event oil, gas or other minerals are produced ...
Grantors ... shall receive not less than one-sixteenth (1/16) portion
(being equal to one-half (1/2) of the customary one-eighth (1/8)
Royalty) ... 97'
Both the trial court and the court of appeals interpreted the reservation
as a fraction "of' royalty rather than as a "fixed" fractional royalty.98 The
appellate court opinion contains an extensive discussion of the difference
between the two types of interests and reviews a 1980 Texas Supreme
Court case involving a reservation that raised the "restated" fraction
problem.99 In that case, Brown v. Havard,oo the majority concluded that the
deed was ambiguous,'' but the dissent viewed the deed as having
90. No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 15, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.). In the interest of full disclosure: I provided an expert opinion in support of Berry's
position.
91. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at *1.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at *4.
96. 266 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 493-94 (alteraton in original) (emphasis added and omitted).
98. See id. at 497-98.
99. See id. at 493-97 (discussing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980)).
100. 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980).
101. Id. at 942.
129
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
unambiguously created a fraction "of' royalty.102 In Range Resources, the
court addressed differences between the two deeds, but ultimately favored
the dissent's approach in Brown.'03 The losing party in Range Resources
asked the Texas Supreme Court to review the appellate court decision, but
the court declined its petition.104
A case decided in 2011 appears consistent with Range Resources
rather than Berry. In Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore,'05 a deed reserved
"an undivided and non-participating one-half interest in the oil, gas, and
other mineral rights" or "one half of the usual one eighth royalty received
forsuch [sic] oil, gas and other minerals produced."106 The court held that
the deed reserved 1/2 "of' the 1/5 landowner's royalty in the subsequent
lease.'07
Although the result in Sundance Minerals reflects the analysis
approach, that opinion, like the Range Resources opinion, does not overtly
address the estate misconception or the legacy of the 1/8 royalty. However,
in reaching their conclusions, both opinions cite extensively to Luckel v.
White and follow its harmonizing approach.'o That 1991 Texas Supreme
Court opinion, in which the court interpreted a multiclause deed, such as the
one at issue in Concord Oil, but with the conflicting fractions 1/4 and 1/32,
102. Id. at 945 (McGee, J., dissenting).
103. See Range Res., 266 S.W.3d at 495-96. A post-Hysaw appellate opinion failed to
address the Brown decision, or the view of the Range Resources court, even though the deed in the
dispute contained language that tracked the reservation in the Brown deed. See infra note 186
(criticizing Laborde). The initial dispute in Range Resources was whether the executive had
breached its duty to the royalty owner by entering into a lease with only a 1/8 landowner's royalty.
Id. at 492. That duty, however, has no application to a "fixed" royalty interest since leasing cannot
affect the share owed to those interest owners. See id. at 493. The duty applies when the interest is
a fraction "of' the lease royalty, since the executive must exercise leasing decisions according to
an "utmost good faith" standard. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 348, 370
(Tex. App-Fort Worth 2013) (noting when the interest is a fraction "of' the lease royalty, the
executive has more control and, therefore, is under an elevated duty), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015). In Range Resources, the
royalty owner claimed the executive could have negotiated for 1/4 landowner's royalty in the
lease. See Range Res., 266 S.W.3d at 492.
104. Petition for Review of Range Resources Corporation and Range Production I, L.P. at
15, Range Res., 266 S.W.3d 490 (No. 08-0949).
105. 354 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
106. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
107. See id. at 512-13 (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment interpreting that
the deed reserved 1/2 of the 1/5 royalty).
108. Id. at 511 ("All parts of the deed are to be harmonized, construing the instrument to
give effect to all of its provisions."); see, e.g., Range Res., 266 S.W.3d at 496 ("Construing the
deeds as a whole, and harmonizing all parts to give effect to the parties' intent, we determine that
a 'fraction of royalty' was conveyed." (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex.
1991))).
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expressly acknowledges the effect of the 1/8 royalty on drafting, even
though that fraction did not appear in the deed:
We do not quarrel with the assumption that the parties probably
contemplated nothing other than the usual one-eighth royalty. But
that assumption does not lead to the conclusion that the parties
intended only a fixed 1/32nd interest. It is just as logical to conclude
that the parties intended to convey one-fourth of all reserved royalty,
and that the reference to 1/32nd in the first three clauses is
"harmonized" because one-fourth of the usual one-eighth royalty is
1/32nd.'09
As in Range Resources, the losing party in Sundance Minerals
petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to review the appellate court's ruling.
That petition stressed the surge of shale production in Texas and the decline
of the usual 1/8 landowner's royalty, and asked the court to provide
guidance:
Practitioners and lower courts dealing with the resurgence of cases
need guidance on significant, recurring issues like the deed
construction dispute presented in this petition for review. Especially
when language in deeds use differing fractions to express the intent
of the parties regarding the character and size of the interest reserved,
it is vitally important that all of the reviewing courts consistently
apply the rules of interpretation and follow established precedent to
reach the same results.110
Despite this plea for guidance, the Texas Supreme Court declined to
review the court of appeal's decision in Sundance Minerals. The court also
denied a petition for review in another appellate opinion from 2012, Coghill
v. Griffith."' That opinion relies heavily on Luckel and cites Range
Resources in concluding that a deed with restated and double fractions
created an "of' royalty interest.'12
However, another recent opinion retreats to the "multiply" approach.
In Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc.,113 the court viewed the following language
as creating a fixed 1/16 royalty interest: "a one-half non-participating
109. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462.
110. Petition for Review of Sundance Minerals, L.P. at vii, Sundance Minerals, 354 S.W.3d
507 (No. 02-10-00403-CV), 2012 WL 3233719, at *vii.
111. See generally Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, pet.
denied).
112. Id. at 838-40 (citing Range Res., 266 S.W.3d at 496) ("The language used in Range
Resources Corp. and in the instant case establishes that the interest reserved was a fraction of
royalty and not a fractional royalty."). The deed's language stated, "the Grantor reserves and
excepts unto himself.. . an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all royalties payable under the terms of
said lease, as well as an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalties
provided for in any future" lease. Id. at 836.
113. 374 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, no pet.).
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royalty interest (one-half of one-eighth of production)."114 In that opinion,
the court relies heavily on the Williams & Meyers treatise, which approves
of multiplying rather than analyzing double fractions, and attempts,
unsatisfactorily, to distinguish Range Resources." 5
Another recent appellate court opinion also strains to distinguish
Range Resources and Sundance Minerals and, like the Moore opinion,
retreats to the multiply approach: Wynne/Jackson Development, L.P. v. PAC
Capital Holdings, Ltd.,116 which involves Barnett shale production from
property in Denton County, Texas."' The relevant language provided that
the grantor reserved:
[A] non-participating royalty of one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth
(1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other materials produced,
saved and sold from the above-described property, provided,
however, that although said reserved royalty is non-participating and
Grantee shall own and possess all leasing rights in and to all oil, gas
and other minerals, Grantor shall, nevertheless, have the right to
receive one-half (1/2) of any bonus, overriding royalty interest, or
other payments, similar or dissimilar, payable under the terms of any
oil, gas and mineral lease covering the above-described property.118
The parties framed the issue as whether the deed reserved a fixed or
fraction "of' royalty.'19 In reversing the trial court and holding the deed
reserved a fixed fractional royalty, the court relied on cases, such as a 1955
114. Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
115. See id. at 647-51. The court also relied on Brown v. Havard, where a deed reserved an
undivided one-half non-participating royalty "([b]eing equal to, not less than an undivided
1/16th)." Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex. 1980). The Brown majority opinion
determined the deed was ambiguous and returned the case to the trial court. See id. at 944. A
dissenting opinion, however, argued that the deed was unambiguous and conveyed a 1/2 "of'
royalty. Id. at 945 (McGee, J., dissenting).
116. No. 13-12-00449-CV, 2013 WL 2470898 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 6, 2013,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
117. See id. at *1.
118. Id. at *4.
119. Id. at *2. The appellate opinion does not suggest that he deed reserved an undivided
1/2 non-executive mineral interest, perhaps in light of the "non-participating royalty" label. Id. at
*4-5. The owner of an undivided 1/2 mineral interest is entitled to 1/2 of the royalty, as explained
above. However, under the French redundancy approach, which focuses on express references to
other mineral estate attributes, that may have been a viable argument. See id. at *3 (citing French
v: Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. 1995)) (comparing the attributes of the
mineral estate owned by a mineral fee owner with those of a non-participating royalty owner).
Here, the grantor reserved a royalty plus the right to receive bonus payments, a mineral-estate
attribute. Id. at *4; see also Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 1986) (finding the deed,
which stripped some mineral-estate attributes, created a non-executive mineral interest rather than
royalty interest). The Altman deed, however, did not expressly label the interest a
"non-participating royalty interest." Id. at 118 (referring instead to a non-participating mineral
interest).
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Texas Supreme Court decision, that multiplied, rather than analyzed, double
fractions.120 In other words, unlike Range Resources and Sundance
Minerals, the Wynne/Jackson decision ignores the legacy of the usual 1/8
landowner's royalty, despite the express reference to that royalty in the
deed.
2. Lessons from the Double and Restated Fraction Cases for the Shale
Era
The results reached in Sundance Minerals, Range Resources, and
Coghill reflect the analysis approach for double and restated fractions.12 1
That approach respects the goal of deed interpretation, which is to ascertain
the intent of the parties. The analysis approach also promotes title stability
by seeking intent from the four corners of the deeds, without resorting to
outside evidence. Sundance Minerals, Range Resources, and Coghill reach
results consistent with language within the deeds. Specifically, the deeds in
each of those cases mention the "usual 1/8 lease royalty" and describe the
interest at issue as a fraction "of' that royalty.122 By noting those provisions
and relying on Luckel's "harmonizing" approach, those opinions
incorporate the legacy of that once-common royalty on drafting into the
interpretative process.
The Berry, Moore, and Wynne/Jackson opinions, on the other hand,
ignore express references to the "usual 1/8 royalty" and other language,
including the reference to a 1/5 interest in Berry and a 1/2 interest in Moore
120. The Wynne/Jackson court cited Harriss v. Ritter, a case which held that the double
fractions 'one-half of one-eighth ... could have but one meaning and that is 1/16th of the
royalty. . . .' See Wynne/Jackson Dev., 2013 WL 2470898, at *4 (quoting Harriss v. Ritter, 279
S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955)).
121. See Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834, 837-40 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2012, pet. denied)
(using the four corners rule to determine that the parties intended to grant a fraction of royalty);
Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 511-13 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet.
denied) (employing only "the express language found within the four corners of the [deed]" to
determine the interest the parties intended to convey); Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d
490, 493, 496-97 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (looking exclusively to the
"[objective] intent expressed or apparent in the writing" to determine the royalty conveyed).
Another recent case expressly endorses the analysis approach and consideration of the "estate
misconception." See Hernandez v. El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at
*4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 14, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Burney, Regrettable
Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine, supra note 14, at 86).
122. See, e.g., Coghill, 358 S.W.3d at 838-39 (harmonizing the differing fractions in the
deed in light of the usual 1/8 royalty); Sundance Minerals, 354 S.W.3d at 511-12 (citation
omitted) (finding the grantor meant to reserve "one half of the usual one eighth" royalty); Range
Res., 266 S.W.3d at 493-95 (noting the problems the estate misconception played in deed
construction).
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and Wynne/Jackson.'23 Further departing from the four-corners rule, the
Moore and Wynne/Jackson opinions insert language not found in the
document-the fraction 1/16.124 In short, these three decisions merely
multiply and fail to analyze the language in the deeds.
For future drafting, the decisions discussed above and others teach
these lessons: drafters should state expressly whether they intend to convey
or reserve a "fixed fractional interest" rather than a fraction "of' the royalty
reserved in existing and any future leases. An additional statement should
expressly clarify that, for instance, a fraction is not a "fixed" interest, if an
"of' or floating royalty interest is intended. And the size of that "fraction
'of royalty" or "fixed royalty" should be stated as a single rather than a
double fraction.
However, as a Texas court noted in Barker v. Levy,125 when reviewing
drafting advice regarding the "mineral or royalty" issue, "[i]t is quite
probable that these [parties] now heartily agree with this advice.12 6
However, "it was written [decades] too late to have been helpful" in the
shale era.127 Title examiners could view the Texas Supreme Court's
decisions declining petitions for review in Sundance Minerals, Range
123. See Wynne/Jackson Dev., 2013 WL 2470898, at *1-2, *5 (finding the interest conveyed
was a fractional royalty, not a fraction of royalty, and entitled Wynne/Jackson to one sixteenth of
production instead of 1/2 of the usual 1/8 royalty); Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374 S.W.3d 644,
651 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (interpreting the deed to "reserve a royalty of one-half of
one-eighth of production, or one-sixteenth"); Hudspeth v. Berry, No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL
2813408, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (interpreting the deed
as granting two fixed royalty interest instead of the "1/5th of 1/8th" royalty).
124. See Moore, 374 S.W.3d at 647-48 (relying on MARTIN & KRAMER, OIL AND GAS
LAW, supra note 27, § 327.2, at 83-94 to insert language into the deed). The Moore opinion also
diverts to another troubled interpretative trail: the court views the lack of a producing well at the
time the deed was drafted as relevant to interpreting the deed. See id. at 651. However, as I have
written in other articles, allowing such extraneous facts to affect the interpretative process detracts
from title stability. See Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 6, at 29, 52-
53 (analyzing the Oklahoma approach, which allows the term "royalty" to change depending on
existence of lease at time of drafting); see also Wynne/Jackson Dev., 2013 WL 2470898, at *1-2
(interpreting deed language describing a "'one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalty in
and to all oil, gas, and other minerals, produced, saved and sold from [such property]' as granting
a fixed royalty of 1/16 of the production).
125. 507 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ. ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Id. at 618.
127. See id. (alteration in original). In addition to the appellate cases discussed above, see
also Leal v. Cuanto Antes Mejor LLC, No. 04-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3999034, at *4 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio July 1, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.), for a case following the harmonizing
approach and concluding the deed conveyed a floating royalty, and Butler v. Horton, 447 S.W.3d
514, 517, 519 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2014, no pet.), for a case construing the deed using the
harmonizing approach to give effect to all provisions in the instrument. But see Jolly v. Wilson,
478 P.2d 886, 887-88 (Okla. 1970) (clinging to estate misconception and choosing to multiply
double fractions).
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Resources, and Coghill as approval of those better-reasoned opinions.128
The Texas Supreme Court's opinions in Luckel and Concord Oil also
support the approach in those three cases by acknowledging the legacy of
the 1/8 royalty.129 Absent firmer endorsement from the state's high court,
however, these mixed opinions may motivate parties to file lawsuits over
deeds with double and restated fractions in the shale era. The next section
addresses whether the recent Hysaw opinion has provided that endorsement.
III. HYSAW V. DAWKINS: THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE
"DOUBLE FRACTION" DILEMMA
In addition to the appellate cases discussed above, the Fourth Court of
Appeals produced two other opinions, reflecting different analytical
approaches to double and restated fractions. One was Dawkins v. Hysaw,130
the opinion eventually reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, and another
was Graham v. Prochaska.131 Handed down only a few months before
Dawkins, Graham held that a grantor reserved a floating 1/2 of the lease
royalty in a new lease based on the reservation of "one-half (1/2) of the
one-eighth (1/8) royalty ... same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16th) of
all oil, gas and other minerals ... ."132 In Graham, the court relied on
Concord Oil and reasoned that the fraction 1/16 could be harmonized in
light of the once-standard 1/8 lease royalty.133 Dissenting justices disagreed,
having concluded that the majority opinion had improperly relied on
outside deeds in reaching its conclusion.134 In Dawkins, however, the Fourth
Court of Appeals does not cite Concord Oil, or invoke the effects of the
"estate misconception" or the "legacy of the 1/8th lease royalty." Instead,
the opinion viewed devises of a 1/3 of 1/8th non-participating royalty as
creating a fixed 1/24th in certain lands, even though the fraction 1/24 does
128. The same reasoning would apply to the Texas Supreme Court's decision not to accept
petitions for the multiclause deed cases, Garza and Hausser. But see TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1 (noting
petitions denied do not carry the same precedential value as petitions refused, which are viewed as
Supreme Court opinions).
129. See Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991) (discussing the "usual
one-eighth royalty"); Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 459
(Tex. 1998) (noting the prevailing royalty in private oil and gas leases was a 1/8 royalty during the
Era in which the Concord deed was executed).
130. See generally Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014),
rev'd, 483 SW.3d 1 (Tex. 2016) (providing a different analytical approach to double and restated
fractions).
131. See generally Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W. 3d 650 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (providing another example of a case taking a different approach to double and
restated fractions).
132. Id. at 658-59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. See id. at 659-60.
134. Id. at 666 (Barnard, J., dissenting).
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not appear anywhere in the mother's will.1 3 5 The losing parties in Graham
and Dawkins filed petitions for review.136 Ultimately, the court denied the
Graham petition and granted the petition in Dawkins.'3 7
A. Hysaw Facts138
The Will. Ethel Hysaw (Ethel) executed her Will in 1947 and died in
1949.139 She was survived by her three children, Inez Hysaw Foote (Inez),
Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr. (Howard) and Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris
(Dorothy).14 0 At the time she executed her Will, Ethel owned three
non-contiguous tracts of land. Under the Will, she gave each child a specific
tract of land-the north 600 acres of a 1065-acre tract went to Inez; the
remaining 465 acres of that tract went to Dorothy; and a separate 200-acre
tract (her homestead) and a 150-acre tract went to Howard.14 1
The Hysaw/Burris heirs, who lost in the court of appeals, argued that
although Ethel gave different surface estates to each child, Ethel gave each
child equal royalty interests in all of the tracts, including the surface tract
willed to each child.14 2 The Will accomplishes this royalty grant in three
paragraphs. The first paragraph sets out the basic grant to all three children
and then provides a long clarification passage regarding what is granted to
Inez.143 The second two paragraphs set out identical clarifying language
with respect to Dorothy and Howard.144 The three paragraphs are set out
below:
That each of my children shall have and hold an undivided one-third
(1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or other minerals
in or under or that may be produced from any of said lands, the same
being a non-participating royalty interest; that is to say, that neither of
my children, to wit, Inez Hysaw Foote shall not participate in any of
the bonus or rentals to keep any lease or leases in force; that it shall
not be necessary for the said Inez Hysaw Foote to execute any oil,
135. See Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 155-57.
136. See Brief for Appellants, Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (No. 04-12-00755-CV), 2013 WL 6815120; Brief of Appellants,
Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d 147 (No. 04-13-00539-CV), 2013 WL 7085831.
137. See Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2016). See generally Graham, 429 S.W.
3d 650 (displaying there is no subsequent Supreme Court opinion).
138. The facts provided here appeared in Hysaw's Brief on the Merits in the Texas Supreme
Court. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 4-6, Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d 1 (No. 14-0984), 2015 WL
4162779, at *1 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at *1, *16.
140. Id. at *1.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *4.
143. Id. at *2-3.
144. Id. at *3-4.
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gas or mineral lease over the lands of Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris
or over the lands of Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., and that it shall not
be necessary for Inez Hysaw Foote to obtain the consent either orally
or written of the said Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris or Howard
Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., to lease any portion of said land so willed to her
for oil, gas or other minerals, but that the said Inez Hysaw Foote shall
receive one-third of one-eighth royalty, provided there is no royalty
sold or conveyed by me covering the lands so willed to her, and
should there be any royalty sold during my lifetime then the said Inez
Hysaw Foote, Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris and Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr. shall each receive one-third of the remainder of the unsold
royalty.
That Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris shall not participate in any of
the bonus or rentals to keep any lease or leases in force; that it shall
not be necessary for the said Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris to
execute any oil, gas or mineral lease over the lands of Inez Hysaw
Foote or over the lands of Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., and it shall
not be necessary for Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris to obtain the
consent, either orally or written, of the said Inez Hysaw Foote or
Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., to lease any portion of said land so
willed to her for oil, gas or other minerals, but that the said Dorothy
Frances Hysaw Burris shall receive one-third of one-eighth royalty,
provided there is no royalty sold or conveyed by me covering the
lands so willed to her, and should there be any royalty sold during my
lifetime then the said Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris, Inez Hysaw
Foote and Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., shall each receive one-third
of the remainder of the unsold royalty.
That Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., shall not participate in any of
the bonus or rentals to keep any lease or leases in force; that it shall
not be necessary for the said Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., to execute
any oil, gas or mineral lease over the lands of Inez Hysaw Foote or
over the lands of Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris, and it shall not be
necessary for Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., to obtain the consent
either orally or written of the said Inez Hysaw Foote or Dorothy
Frances Hysaw Burris to lease any portion of said land so willed to
him for oil, gas or other minerals, but that the said Howard Caldwell
Hysaw, Jr., shall receive one-third of one-eighth royalty, provided
there is no royalty sold or conveyed by me covering the lands so
willed to him, and should there be any royalty sold during my
lifetime then the said Howard Caldwell Hysaw, Jr., Inez Hysaw
Foote and Dorothy Frances Hysaw Burris shall each receive one-third
of the remainder of the unsold royalty.145
145. Id. at *2-4.
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The Hysaw and amici curiae briefs urged the Court to consider that
Ethel's grant to each child of different surface tracts and a grant to each
child of an equal share in the royalties in all tracts is a common approach in
partitioning surface and mineral estates.146 When partitioning surface and
mineral estates by deed or will, owners often grant unequal surface estates
to family members but-because mineral estates cannot be easily valued-
require equal sharing in the oil and gas production from all tracts. 147
In 1946, before she executed the Will, Ethel gave each child an equal
share in some of her royalties in the 200- and 150-acre tracts given to
Howard.148 The six deeds making these conveyances give each child an
equal portion of Ethel's royalty in each tract.149 The Hysaw and Weafer
Petitioners (Hysaws) are Howard's descendants."so The Burrises, the Burris
partnership and the Dziuk Petitioners are Dorothy's descendants or
successors.151 The Burrises and Hysaws are referred to collectively as the
"Hysaw/Burrisses." The Dawkins and Oxford Respondents are Inez's
descendants and are collectively referred to as the "Dawkins."l 52
The Dispute. This dispute arose after production occurred on a 1/5
royalty lease the Dawkins executed on Inez's 600 acres.153 Under a 1/8
royalty lease that was the standard when Ethel executed her Will, all parties
would have agreed that the Will provided each of her three children with
equal shares of the royalty.154 The Dawkins, however, contend[ed] that,
under the 1/5 royalty lease they executed, the Will provide[d] them with
over three times the royalty provided to Howard and Dorothy's
146. The Hysaw's Brief on the Merits urged the court to consider this customary approach to
partitioning land and minerals, as did Mr. Jeff Akins in an amicus curiae brief he filed. See id.;
Brief of Amicus Curiae Jeffrey R. Akins, Attorney at Law at 1-3, Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d 1 (No. 14-
0984), 2015 WL 636734, at *1-3. Two other amicus curiae briefs were filed. One by two former
chairs of the Oil, Gas and Energy Resources Section of the State Bar of Texas, Cottingham Miles
and Allen Cummings, and another on behalf of Trinity Minerals, Inc., filed by J. Byron Burton III.
See Brief of Aniicus Curiae at 1-5, Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d 1 (No. 14-0984), 2015 WL 751689, at *1-
5; Brief of Amicus Curiae Trinity Mineral Management, Ltd. at 6-15, Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d 1 (No.
14-0984), 2015 WL 1884828, at *6-15.
147. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 138, at 7 ("Because parties to a voluntary
partition are often unwilling to run the risk that only part of the land may contain oil and gas, it is
not uncommon for cotenants to partition only the surface and continue to own undivided interests
in the minerals estate." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SMITH & WEAVER, supra note




151. Id. at *7-8.
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descendants."' The Hysaw/Burrisses contend[ed] that the Will created
equal floating 1/3 of royalty interests, meaning all three children share
equally regardless of the size of the lease royalty in all of the lands devised
under the Will. 15 6
The Dawkins [argued] that Howard's and Dorothy's descendants each
received only a fixed 1/24 royalty in Inez's land and that the Dawkins
therefore get all royalty in excess of a 2/24 royalty on Inez's lands. At the
same time, the Dawkins claim[ed] that equal sharing is required on
Howard's two tracts because Ethel conveyed some of the royalty on those
tracts before she died."' For this argument, they rely on the final phrase
regarding any 'sale' of royalties before Ethel's death. The parties stipulated
to the pertinent facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment." The
district court granted the Hysaw/Burrisses' motion, requiring equal sharing
to apply for royalties in all of the lands. The Dawkins appealed.159
The court of appeals reversed. In its opinion, the court began by
examining the three phrases in the royalty paragraphs "individually" and
determining what each one meant.160 The court first addressed the phrase
that "each of my children shall have and hold an undivided one-third (1/3)
of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or other minerals in or under
or that may be produced" and held that this language "clearly and
unambiguously describes a fractional royalty interest"-a 1/24 royalty.16 1
The court stated this phrase was a "reservation" of fixed 1/24 royalties only
for Dorothy and Howard. Later in the opinion, the court also calls it a
"grant."1 62
The court held that the second phrase, that "[each child] shall receive
one-third of one-eighth royalty" also "clearly describes a fractional royalty
interest-a fixed fraction of production' and further held that it 'simply
restates the first provision's grant."1 63 The court treated this phrase as
applying to all three children and stated it did not "limit[] the surface estate
owner of any royalty in excess of 1/24 of production," indicating the
surface estate owner's ownership of royalty in excess of 1/8 came from "the
earlier grant of fee simple title." 64 Finally, the court held that the third
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *8-9.
158. Id. at *9.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014),
rev'd, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016)).
162. Id. (quoting Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 155).
163. Id. at *10 (quoting Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 154, 156).
164. Id. (quoting Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 156).
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phrase was "clear and unambiguous" and "conditionally conveys a fraction
of royalty interest" i.e., a second grant of a floating 1/3 of the royalty in
Howard's lands to each child because Ethel had conveyed some of those
royalties to her children before she died. The court refers to this third phrase
both as a conveyance and as a "conditional reservation of a fraction of
royalty."l6 5
These holdings resulted in Inez's descendants receiving royalties under
the Dawkins' lease more than three times greater than her siblings'
descendants but sharing equally in royalties from any lease on the tracts
given to Howard.166 In contrast, under the Hysaw/Burrises' interpretation of
Ethel's Will, the children share equally by owning a floating 1/3 NPRi in all
three tracts.167 In its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court agrees with this
equal-sharing interpretation.1 6 8
B. The Texas Supreme Court Opinion: Affirming a "Holistic" Analytical
Approach Rather Than "Merely Multiplying" Double Fractions
The Texas Supreme Court's opinion begins with this description of the
issue:
Questions arise about whether double fractions must be multiplied
and the royalty interest fixed without regard to the royalty negotiated
in a future mineral lease (fractional royalty) or whether 1/8 was
intended as a synonym for the landowner's royalty, meaning the
interest conveyed varies depending on the royalty actually obtained
in a future mineral lease (fraction of royalty).169
In answering these questions, the court reaffirmed its commitment to a
"holistic approach" aimed at ascertaining intent from the entire
document.7 o For that reason, the court eschewed mechanical or bright-line
rules, such as merely multiplying double fractions."' In criticizing the court
of appeals' decision, the court opined that the lower court had departed
from this holistic approach by viewing the separate clauses in the will in
isolation.17 2
Demonstrating its commitment to the "holistic approach," the opinion
carefully and thoroughly addressed all the language in the will.' 73 Key
165. Id. (quoting Dawkins, 450 S.W.3d at 155).
166. Id. at *10-11.
167. Id. at *11.
168. See Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2016).
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id. at 13.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 13-14.
173. See id. at 8, 13-15.
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phrases the court emphasized included the deliberate recitation of identical
language to affect each child's royalty, and the use of a double fraction in
lieu of single fixed fractions-with one suggesting "equality among the
three children (1/3) and the other raising the specter of estate misconception
or use of the then-standard 1/8 royalty as a synonym for the landowner's
royalty." 17 4
By acknowledging the influence of the 1/8 landowner's royalty, the
court confirmed its statement in Concord Oil that the "estate
misconception" remains instructive but not determinative in the deed
interpretation process."' Yet the opinion's thorough analysis of the estate
misconception and the influence of the once-standard 1/8 royalty on
drafting signals that title examiners should consistently turn to those
explanations when interpreting deeds with different fractions that are
multiples of 1/8. For example, citing Luckel, the Hysaw opinion describes,
"The near ubiquitous nature of the 1/8 royalty-dubbed by some as 'the
legacy of the 1/8th royalty' or 'historical standardization'-no doubt
influenced the language used to describe the quantum of royalty in
conveyances of a certain vintage."l7 6 Additionally, the opinion criticizes
merely multiplying fractions as a "mechanical approach" that "fails to
accord any significance to the use of double fractions."'7 7 Endorsing the
analysis approach this Article describes above, the court describes its
previous decisions, including Luckel and Concord Oil, as "our precedent"
for "an analytical approach that emphasizes the four-corners rule and
harmonization principles.""7
Adhering to the harmonizing principles, the opinion returns to the
express language of Ethel's will. The court noted the equal-sharing
language in the third and final provision of each royalty clause supported a
conclusion that she intended for each of her three children to share equally
in the royalties under all the divided tracts.179 After a review of case law and
the language in the will, the court concluded:
The only plausible construction supported by a holistic reading of the
will is that Ethel used "one-eighth royalty" as shorthand for the entire
royalty interest a lessor could retain under a mineral lease, anticipated
the siblings would share that royalty equally, and intended
proportional equalization of any royalty remaining following an inter
174. Id. at 15.
175. See id. at 8, 13.
176. Id. at 9-10 (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. 1957); Graham v.
Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)).
177. Id. at 12.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 15.
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vivos transaction. We therefore hold that Ethel's will devised to each
child 1/3 of any and all royalty interest on all the devised land
tracts. 180
IV. CONCLUSIONS: HYSAW'S IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERPRETING AND
DRAFTING IN THE SHALE ERA
With Hysaw, the Texas Supreme Court answered pleas for guidance to
resolve the conflicting interpretative approaches among appellate courts. As
discussed above, those approaches fall into one of two camps: (1) the
mechanical or "merely multiply" approach that failed to incorporate the
legacy of the 1/8 royalty or the effect of estate misconception on drafting
into the interpretative process; and (2) the analysis approach, which
harmonized conflicting fractions, which are consistently multiples of the
once-common 1/8 royalty, by acknowledging the effects of the estate
misconception on drafting.' Although Hysaw reaffirms a "holistic"
approach that requires analyzing all language and provisions in documents,
it eschewed the mechanical approach and endorsed the analysis approach.
Hysaw should provide confidence to title examiners who have declined to
"merely multiply" double fractions when one of those fractions is the
once-common 1/8th landowner's royalty. And for those considering
litigation, other courts are likely to view the 1/8th as meaning "landowner's
royalty," and the fraction paired with the 1/8th as reflecting the parties'
intent regarding the size of the floating non-participating royalty interest
conveyed or reserved. Moreover, in light of Hysaw's confirmation of the
analysis approach as established in the multiclause deed cases, Concord Oil
and Luckel, the estate misconception should be applied even when the 1/8th
fraction does not appear in the deed. Recall that in Concord Oil, the court
interpreted the conflicting fractions 1/12 and 1/96 as conveying a single
1/12 mineral interest. Similarly, in Luckel v White, the court interpreted the
fractions 1/32 and 1/4 as conveying a floating 1/4th non-participating
royalty interest. Neither deed contained express references to the once-
common 1/8th landowner's royalty, yet both opinions addressed the legacy
of that royalty in the interpretative process.182
Unfortunately, a post-Hysaw opinion from the same court that Hysaw
reversed has created title uncertainty in an opinion interpreting a deed with
180. Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
181. See supra Part II.C.
182. See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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"restated fractions." In Laborde Properties v. U. S. Shale Energy II,183 the
court held the following reservation created a fixed 1/16th non-participating
royalty rather than a 1/2 floating interest: "There is reserved and excepted
from this conveyance unto the grantors herein,... an undivided one-half
(1/2) interest in and to the Oil Royalty, Gas Royalty and Royalty . . . the
same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the production."'8 4 The court's
opinion reversed the trial court's ruling that this language created a floating
1/2 royalty interest, and contradicted the same conclusion reached by a
disinterested operator charged with paying royalties from the land.1ss In
reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals opinion departs from Hysaw,
Concord Oil, and Luckel by failing to acknowledge that under the estate
misconception the fractions 1/16 and 1/2 can be harmonized because 1/16
represents the amount of royalty owed to the owner of a 1/2 floating NPRi
under a lease with the once-common 1/8 lease royalty. Contradicting those
Texas Supreme Court opinions, the Laborde opinion suggests that such a
harmonizing approach is not permitted unless the fraction 1/8 appears in the
deed.'86 Additionally, the Laborde reservation tracks language in a 1980
Texas Supreme Court case discussed above, Brown v. Havard, yet Laborde
never cites or analyzes the Brown case.'87
183. Laborde Props., L.P. v. U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC, No. 04-16-00168-CV, 2016 WL
5922404 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 12, 2016), reh'g denied, No. 04-16-00168-CV, 2016 WL
7445084 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 28, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
184. Id. at*1.
185. Appellees' Motion for Rehearing En Banc at 7, Laborde, 2016 WL 7445084 (No. 04-
16-00168-CV) (citing the trial court's ruling finding reservation created a floating NPRi and
describing payor EOG's conclusion that the deed created a floating NPRi after reviewing Hysaw
and other fourth district court of appeals decisions). The author of this article was hired to
contribute to this Motion.
186. Compare Laborde, 2016 WL 5922404, at *9 ("The 1951 deed does not contain any
language from which we can objectively find the parties assumed a one-eighth (1/8) royalty in any
current or future lease."), with Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d
451, 459-60 (Tex. 1998) (recognizing court has taken judicial notice of usual 1/8 royalty when
interpreting factions that are multiples of 1/8), and Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex.
1991) (recognizing parties "contemplated nothing other than the usual one-eighth royalty" and
holding deed with fractions 1/32 and 1/4 conveyed a floating 1/4 NPRi). See supra Part IIB, for a
discussion of the conclusions of Concord Oil and Luckel. In a footnote, the Laborde opinion
proclaims, "There is nothing to suggest the [estate misconception] theory applies only to show an
intent to create a floating as opposed to a fixed interest." Laborde, 2016 WL 5922404, at *10 n.3.
Although it is correct that the estate misconception does not create a bright-line rule, the Laborde
opinion fails to properly acknowledge that the fractions here are multiples of 1/8th, which
effectively ignores the presence of the 1/2 fraction, an approach that violates Hysaw's holistic
approach. Just as Hysaw criticized the lower court for reading the fraction 1/24 into that deed, in
Laborde, the same court fails to give weight to the initial 1/2 fraction.
187. See Appellees' Motion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 185, at 8-11. See supra Part
II.C.1, for a discussion of Brown. See also Order on Appellees' Motion for En Banc
Reconsideration, Laborde, 2016 WL 5922404 (04-16-00168-CV) (dissent to the denial by Chief
Judge Marion and Judge Martinez; dissent with opinion by Judge Chapa).
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In contrast to Laborde, another post-Hysaw appellate court opinion,
Greer v. Shook, emulates the Texas Supreme Court's approach to
interpreting a multiclause deed with the conflicting fractions 1/16 and
1/2.188 After first determining that the multiclause deed conveyed a mineral
interest, the court engaged in the harmonizing process to determine whether
the grantee received a 1/16 or 1/2 interest.189 in concluding the deed
conveyed a 1/2 mineral interest, the court harmonized the presence of the
1/16 fraction by noting that the drafter "used the fraction 1/16 in paragraphs
1 and 6 as shorthand for expressing that he intended to convey 1/2 of what
he believed was his remaining 1/8 mineral interest in the land, i.e., 1/2 of
that purported 1/8 interest."90 As part of that process, the court turned to
the estate misconception and the effect of the once-common 1/8 royalty on
drafting, even though the deed at issue did not contain the 1/8 fraction. For
other post-Hysaw disputes over deeds with conflicting, double, or restated
fractions, courts, producers, lawyers, and other title examiners should heed
the lessons of Hysaw as reflected in Greer.
Drafting Lessons. When drafting these interests in the future, parties
can avoid the unpredictable results demonstrated in the pre-Hysaw (and
post-Hysaw) opinions by using the "fixed" or "floating" labels."' For
example: "Grantor hereby conveys to Grantee a fixed 1/16th non-
participating royalty interest." If the parties intend to create an NPRi that
will "float" with the royalty reserved in any lease on the property, existing
or future, the document should make that statement: "Grantor hereby
reserves a 1/2 non-participating royalty interest (not a mineral interest) that
will float with the size of the landowner's royalty reserved in any lease on
the premises conveyed herein." To avoid confusion and litigation, omit a
second "restated" fraction reflecting the amount of production the owner
will receive as a matter of law. Similarly, in describing the size of the
intended floating fraction, which was 1/3 in Hysaw, parties should avoid
double fractions ("1/3 of 1/8th" from Hysaw). In fact, the "legacy of the
1/8th lease royalty" includes the lesson that it has no place in drafting shale
era mineral and royalty interests.
188. Greer v. Shook, No. 08-15-00040-CV, 2016 WL 6092963, at *8 (Tex. App.-El Paso
Oct. 19, 2016).
189. Id. at *11.
190. Id. at *14.
191. The Texas Supreme Court has confirmed that labels should be used to clarify whether
the parties intend to create a mineral or a royalty interest. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles,
supra note 5, at 126-28 (discussing Texas cases that confirmed the value of the "royalty" label in
interpreting and drafting).
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